Abstract-A secret key agreement framework between three users is considered in which each of the users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret key with user 3 and users 1 and 2 are eavesdroppers with respect to each other. There is a generalized discrete memoryless multiple access channel (GDMMAC) from users 1 and 2 to user 3 where the three users receive outputs from the channel. Furthermore, there is a broadcast channel (BC) from user 3 to users 1 and 2. Secret key sharing is intended where GDMMAC and BC can be successively used. In this framework, an inner bound of the secret key capacity region is derived. Moreover, for a special case where the channel inputs and outputs of the GDMAC and the BC form Markov chains in some order, the secret key capacity region is derived. Also the results are discussed through a binary example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ahlswede and Csiszar [1] and Maurer [2] introduced the problem of secret key sharing across the broadcast channel where, in addition to the broadcast channel, there is a noiseless public channel for communication between the transmitter and the receiver through which, all communications can be overheard by the eavesdropper. Secret key sharing over a pair of broadcast channels between two legitimate users in the presence of an eavesdropper was investigated in [4] . Furthermore, secrecy has been investigated in other frameworks where a user can be a legitimate user and simultaneously an eavesdropper. The broadcast channel with two confidential messages is investigated in [9] in which the transmitter intends to send independent confidential messages to two receivers where the receivers are eavesdroppers of each other's message. The generalized multiple access channel with two confidential messages was investigated in [5] where each of the two transmitters intends to send his message to the receiver and at the same time obtains information about the other transmitter's message through the received output from the channel. Secret key sharing over generalized multiple access channel has been investigated in [6] and [7] where each of the two transmitters wishes to share a secret key with the receiver while keeping it concealed from the other transmitter. In [6] , there is a nioseless public channel from the transmitters to the receiver in addition to the generalized multiple access channel. In [7] , there is a noiseless public channel from the receiver to the transmitters in such a way that the transmitters send information to the receiver through the generalized multiple access channel and the receiver communicates with the transmitters via the public channel.
We consider secret key sharing in a framework similar to [7] but in more conformity with real communication scenarios. There is a generalized discrete memoryless multiple access channel (GDMMAC) in the forward direction from users 1 and 2 to user 3 where in addition to user 3, the other users receive noisy outputs from the channel. Furthermore, instead of a public channel from user 3 to users 1 and 2 as in [7] , there is a broadcast channel (BC) in the backward direction from user 3 to users 1 and 2. In this framework, users 1 and 2 intend to share secret keys with user 3 while users 1 and 2 are eavesdroppers with respect to each other. Users 1 and 2 send information to user 3 over the GDMMAC in the forward direction and user 3 answers them over the BC in the backward direction. The BC in the backward direction is used by user 3 to send feedback from the received output from the GDMMAC and also the inherent secrecy of the BC increases the secret key rates. This framework can be realized in a wireless network where users 1 and 2, as network users, can communicate with user 3, as a base station, through uplink (GDMMAC) and user 3 can communication with them through downlink (BC) and each of the network useres wishes to share a secret key with the base station hidden from the other user. We have derived an inner bound of the secret key capacity region. For a special case where the channel inputs and outputs of the GDMMAC and the BC form Markov chains in some orders, the secret key capacity region is obtained. Also a binary example is introduced and the bilateral effect of increasing the channel noise from user 3 to user 1 in the backward direction on the secret key capacity region is discussed.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the preliminaries of our secret key framework are given. An inner bound of the secret key capacity region is given in Sections III. The secret key capacity for a special case and a binary example are presented in Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V. Proofs of the results are presented in Appendices. In the paper, a random variable is denoted by an upper case letter and its realization is denoted by the corresponding lower case letter. We use X N i to indicate vector (X i,1 , X i,2 , ..., X i,N ), and X k i,j to indicate vector (X i,j , X i,j+1 , ..., X i,k ), where i denotes the index of the corresponding user.
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II. PRELIMINARIES Users 1, 2 and 3 communicate over a pair of noisy channels. There is a GDMMAC in the forward direction from users 1 and 2 to user 3 and a BC from user 3 to users 1 and 2 in the backward direction. In the forward direction, users 1 and 2 govern inputs X 1f and X 2f of the GDMMAC with probability distribution P Y 1f ,Y 2f ,Y 3f |X 1f ,X 2f , and outputs Y 1f , Y 2f and Y 3f are seen by users 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In the backward direction, user 3 governs input X 3b of the BC with probability distribution P Y 1b ,Y 2b |X 3b , and outputs Y 1b and Y 2b are seen by users 1 and 2, respectively. Users 1 and 2 intend to share secret keys with user 3 where user 1 is the eavesdropper of user 2's key and vice versa. For simplicity, it is assumed that, like in [5] , each transmitter uses the channel outputs to eavesdrop and not as inputs to the encoder when using the GDMMAC. Our results can be easily generalized to the situation where the channel outputs at the transmitters are used as inputs to the encoders of the GDMMAC as in [10] , however it is beyond the scope of the present work. We represent the formal definition of the described secret key sharing as shown in Fig.1 .
Step 1) n f uses of the GDMMAC: Users 1 and 2 randomly generate independent keys K 1f and K 2f , respectively, and determine the i-th channel inputs X 1f,i and X 2f,i to the GDMMAC for i = 1, 2, ..., n f as stochastic mappings of the corresponding keys. Subsequently, the outputs Y 1f,i , Y 2f,i and Y 3f,i are observed by users 1, 2 and 3, respectively. User 3 estimates keysK 1f andK 2f as deterministic function of Y n f 3f .
Step 2) n b uses of the BC: User 3 generates keys K 1b and K 2b , as stochastic functions of Y n f 3f to share with users 1 and 2, respectively, and then, determines the i-th channel input X 3b,i to the BC for i = 1, 2, ..., n b as a stochastic mapping of Y After these steps, the key pair (K 1f , K 1b ) is shared between user l and user 3 and the key pair (K 2f , K 2b ) is shared between user 2 and user 3. All the above keys take values in some finite sets. Now, we state the conditions that should be met in the described secret key sharing framework.
Definition 1: In the secret key sharing of the proposed model, the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is an achievable key rate pair if for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n f and n b , we have: III. MAIN RESULTS Now, the main result of the paper is presented. First, we define:
Theorem 1: In the described setup, all rates in the closure of the convex hull of the set of all key rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) that satisfy the following region, are achievable:
subject to the constraints:
for random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to distribution:
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix I. Here, the justification of the above rates is given. As seen in (6), user 1's secret key rate consists of three components. The first term, R 1f , is the rate of the key (K 1f ) that can be generated by user 1 and shared between user 1 and user 3 in the forward direction using only the GDMMAC. The second term, R 1f b , is the rate that could be generated from the correlated observations in the forward direction; meaning that the channel outputs of the GDMMAC can be regarded as correlated source observations at the users for secret key generation. For this purpose, user 3 generates K 1f b as a function of the received output from GDMMAC for sharing with user 1 and the required information should be sent by user 3 over the BC in the backward direction. The constraints in (7) arise from the fact that the information sent by user 3 should be subject to rate limitations in the backward direction.
Indeed, K 1f b is the key that is generated using the correlated observation in the forward direction between users 1 and 3, however, the required information for this goal is transmitted over BC in the backward direction. The third component,R 1b , is the rate of the key (K 1b ) that can be shared between users 1 and 3 using the inherent secrecy of the BC. User 2's key rate and the sum rate can be justified in the same way.
Remark 1: If we cancel the BC by setting Theorem 1 , the region reduces to the secrecy rate region of the GDMMAC with two confidential messages as discussed in [5] where the transmitters are eavesdropper with respect to each other.
Remark 2: If we cancel the GDMMAC by setting
in Theorem 1, the region reduces to the secrecy rate region of the BC with two confidential messages as discussed in [9] where the BC's receivers are eavesdroppers with respect to each other.
Remark 3: If we convert the BC to a noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity in the backward direction by setting Y 1b = Y 2b and considering I(X 3b ; Y 1b ) as infinity in Theorem 1, the region reduces to the secret key rate region of the GDMMAC with the backward public channel as in [7] .
IV. SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we derive the secret key capacity region for a special case.
Corollary 1: When the GDMMAC and BC inputs and outputs form Markov chains as
and X 3b −Y 2b −Y 1b , the secret key capacity region is the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) that satisfy:
subject to the constraint:
for random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution:
The achievability can be inferred from Theorem 1 by substituting
, and using the above Markov chains. The converse is proved in Appendix II. In this case, due to Markov chains (X 1f , X 2f )−Y 2f −Y 3f and (X 1f , X 2f )−Y 1f −Y 3f , none of users 1 and 2 can share a secret key with user 3 in the forward direction using just the GDMMAC. However, after the GDMMAC outputs are received in the forward direction by the three users, secret key sharing can be established by user 3 through the noisy BC. For this purpose, user 3 uses the correlation between the received output from the GDMMAC to share a secret key to user 1. The required information is sent to user 1 over the backward BC by user 3 and the rate constraint in (8) is due to this fact. It is evident that no secret key can be shared between user 3 and user 2 using GDMMAC outputs due to Markov chain Y 2f − Y 1f − Y 3f . On the other hand, user 3 can agree on a secret key with user 2 exploiting the inherent secrecy of the backward BC which is in favor of user 2 due to Markov chain X 3b −Y 2b −Y 1b . With these arguments, achievability of the above key capacity region is justified.
In the following, an example is given to make sense of the secret key sharing in the described framework.
Example 1: Consider binary GDMMAC and BC where all channel inputs and outputs have alphabets {0, 1}. The GDMMAC and BC input-output relationships at time instant i are according to:
in which E j,i is a binary random variable with the distribution Pr(E j,i = 1) = p j where 0 < p j ≤ 0.5 for j = 1, .., 4. The random variables E j,i for j = 1, .., 4 are independent of each other. In this example, it can be seen that the GDMMAC and BC inputs and outputs satisfy the same Markov chains as in Corollary 1. Hence, no secret key can be shared just using the GDMMAC in the forward direction. As it was illustrated in the case of Corollary 1, the channel outputs of the GDMMAC can be used by user 3 as source observations and secret key agreement can be established between users 3 and 1 due to the Markov chain Y 2f −Y 1f −Y 3f . In fact, the correlation between the noises received by users 1 and 3 from GDMMAC is the potential to generate secrecy. This necessitates sending the required information of the source common randomness from user 3 to user 1 and the backward BC is used to send such information. It should be noted that due to the Markov chain X 3b −Y 2b −Y 1b , the backward channel is favorable for user 2 to generate secrecy. Indeed, the backward channel from user 3 to user 1 just serves as a public channel with limited capacity. In this example, we assume fixed value for the parameter p j for j = 1, 2, 3 and investigate the impact of varying p 4 on the secret key capacity region. The secret key capacity region is shown for six values of p 4 in Fig. 2 . For p 4 = 0, the users 1 and 2 receive same outputs from the BC and so no secret key can be shared between users 2 and 3. In this state, the BC channel can be treated as a public channel with limited capacity from user 3 to the other users to send the required information from user 3 to user 1 in order to key agreement using the channel outputs of GDMMAC. As p 4 increases, the secret key rate between users 3 and 2 would increase as user 1 receives a more noisy output from BC with respect to user 2's received output. On the other hand, increment of p 4 worsen the backward channel from user 3 to 1 and hence, less information can be sent from user 3 to user 1and this results in reducing the secret key rate between users 3 and 1. Therefore, increment of p 4 has a two-side effect on the secret key capacity region. As p 4 reaches to 0.5, the backward channel from user 3 to user 1 becomes a completely random channel and the secret key sharing would be possible just between users 3 and 2.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of consecutive secret key sharing over a GDM-MAC and BC was studied where users 1 and 2 intended to share secret keys with user 3 while they were eavesdroppers 
with respect to each other. The inner bound of the secret key capacity region was derived. Also, the secret key capacity region was obtained for a special case where the GDMMAC was in favor of user 1 and the BC was in favor of user 2. Also through an example, the bilateral effect of increasing the channel noise from user 3 to user 1 was investigated.
APPENDIX I Proof of Theorem 1
We fix the distribution to be the same as in Theorem 1. As described in Section II, the secret key sharing is established in two steps; n f uses of the GDMMAC and n b uses of the BC. In continue, we describe code construction, encoding and decoding of the two steps separately and then, the security analysis is given.
First, we consider using the GDMMAC. Users 1 and 2 independently generate typical sequences t n f 1f and t n f 2f , respectively, each with probability:
The number of the sequences t n f 1f and t n f 2f are 2 n f (r 1f +r 1f ) and 2 n f (r 2f +r 2f ) , respectively, and they are labeled as:
in which ε > 0 can be arbitrarily small. For the first step encoding, when a key index k 1f is chosen by user 1, an index k 1f is randomly selected and then for t n f 1f (k 1f , k 1f ), the channel input x n f 1f is sent according to the distribution p(x 1f |t 1f ). The same is performed by user 2.
For the first step decoding, user 3 chooses the sequences t
2f (k 2f , k 2f )) exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. It can be shown that the decoding error probability of this step is bounded as:
If we set:
then we have:
. By setting ε > 3ε 1 , for example ε = 4ε 1 = ε 2 , we choose n f sufficiently large that 2 n f (−ε +3ε1) ≤ ε 1 , and then
At the end of the first step, user 3 generates secret keys of the second step as stochastic functions of the channel output y nf 3f and sends required information to users 1 and 2 via the backward BC. In this step, user 3 generates 2 n f (I(T 1f b ;Y 3f )+ε ) and 2 n f (I(T 2f b ;Y 3f )+ε ) typical sequences t nf 1f b and t nf 2f b , respectively, each with probability:
These sequences are labeled using two-layered random binning as:
where:
in which ε >0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. It is obvious that 2b , each with probability:
The number of sequences t n b 1b and t n b 2b are 2 n b (r 1b +r 1b ) and 2 n b (r 2b +r 2b ) , respectively, and they are labeled as:
which ε > 0 can be arbitrarily small. Due to the inequalities in (7), two functions f 1 and f 2 can be defined as:
where T 1b and T 2b are, respectively, the set of 2 1b into 2 n f r 1f b equal-sized parts. Elements of part i are labeled as (T 1b ) i . Mapping f 2 is similarly defined. Now, we describe the coding scheme of the second step, i.e., using the BC in the backward direction. In this step, user 3 shares two keys with each of users 1 and 2, one derived from the correlation of GDMMAC outputs at the users and the other derived from the inherent secrecy of the BC. With access to sequence y n f 3f , user 3 chooses the codewords t 2b (k 2b , k 2b ), user 3 considers the corresponding indices k 1b and k 2b as the third parts of the keys to be shared with users 1 and 2, respectively. Then the channel input x nb 3b is sent over the BC according to the distributions p(x 3b |t 1b , t 2b ) by user 3.
For the second step decoding, user 1, first, decodes the sequence t 
1b (k 1b , k 1b ) exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. It can be seen that the decoding error probability is bounded as:
and so, by choosing ε > ε 1 and considering n b sufficiently large, it can be bounded as:
User 1 considers k 1b as the third part of his secret key with user 3. After that, user 1 finds the mapping (T 1b ) i of codeword t n b 1b and sets k 1f b = i. Now, user 1 decodes sequence t n f 1f b if:
exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. For ε 1 = ε 8 , according to Wyner-Ziv problem for multiple sources in [8] , it can be seen that the decoding error probability of the sequence t n f 1f b yields as:
By choosing 2ε > ε 1 and considering n f sufficiently large, it can be bounded as
After successful decoding, user 1 considers k 1f b as the second part of his secret key with user 3. By the above arguments, the secret key triple (k 1f , k 1f b , k 1b ) can be shared between users 1 and 3 and the total decoding error probabilities is bounded as:
The same steps can be followed for the secret key triple (k 2f , k 2f b , k 2b ) between users 2 and 3. Now, we should check the security conditions of definition 1. We give the proof of (3) and by symmetry, (4) can be deduced. As the keys (K 1f b , K 1b ) are shared in the backward direction, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
We analyze the three terms separately. Some Markov chains useful in the security analysis are given below. These Markov chains arise from the coding scheme.
For term A, we have:
In above equations, (a) follows from the fact that index k 2f is one of the indices of t n f 2f . (b) is due to Markov chain (10) and (c) follows from the fact that index k 2f b is one of the indices of t n f 2f b . To prove (d), the same approach as lemma 2 and 3 in [9] can be exploited to show
(e) is deduced from the reliable decoding condition of k 1f . (f) can be deduced from the same approaches as (d).
For term B, we have:
In the above equations, (a) can be deduced from the Markov chain (10) and (b) from the same arguments in term A.
For term C, we have:
In the above equations, (a) and (b) can be deduced from the Markov chain (11). To prove (b), the same approach as lemma 2 and 3 in [9] is exploited to show
By substituting ε = ε 12 , ε i = ε 9 , ε j = ε 2 for i = 2, .., 5 and j = 6, 7, the security condition (3) is satisfied as:
To show that the total rate of user 1's secret key is the sum of the rates r 1f , r 1f b and r 1b , we should prove the independency of the keys. When analyzing terms B and C of the security condition, we show that:
and hence:
and this completes the proof of theorem 1. It should be noted that in the code construction of the second step, we implicitly assume I(T 1b ; Y 1b ) ≥ I(T 1b ; Y 2b , T 2b ). In the case where I(T 1b ; Y 1b ) < I(T 1b ; Y 2b , T 2b ), user 3 randomly maps k 1f b into a space with 2 n b (I(T 1b ;Y 1b )−ε 1 ) elements and no secret key is chosen as k 1b . The same is true about user 2's codebook.
APPENDIX II Proof of the converse in Corollary 2
To derive the outer bound in Corollary 1, it is assumed that the keys are produced in two steps as discribed in Section 2.
Applying Fano's inequality to the corresponding keys at the users, for an arbitrary smallε > 0, we obtain:
where |K 1f | is the cardinality of key set K 1f and ε i → 0 if ε → 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Now, we show that for the secret keys satisfying above reliability conditions and the security conditions (3) and (4) in Definition 1, there exist random variables according to the distribution of Corollary 1 satisfying the mentioned relations. We prove the outer bound of R 1 . The outer bound of R 2 can be deduced using the same approaches. Before launching proof, Markov chains are given which are useful in continue:
It is defined: ε = 2(n f + n b )ε + n f ε1 + n b ε2 (n f + n b ) .
We have: and considering the random variable Q which is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, ..., N }. With the same approach, it can be shown that:
(n f +n b )R 2 ≤ n b I(X 3b ; Y 2b |Y 1b ) +2(n f +n b )ε+n f ε 1 +n b ε 3 .
In the following, the rate constraint in corollary 1 is proved. 
